Since mid-March, Russia and Ukraine have both been massing troops along the borders of the Russian-annexed Crimea and the conflict zone in Ukraine’s eastern Donbass region The parties‘ intentions are unclear, but the suspicion is that Russia is preparing to invade Ukraine.
The Kremlin has not given any details about the units involved, but it has also not tried to hide their movements as multiple sources report on their maneuvers along the border.
Some are suggesting that the buildup of Russia’s forces amounts to 16 battalion tactical groups, which would be up to 14,000 soldiers. The office of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky puts the estimate far higher at about 40,000 Russian troops on the eastern border and about 40,000 in Crimea. Ukraine is reported to have 90,000 of its own forces deployed on its side of the border.
Both Kyiv and Moscow are also undertaking massive military exercises, with each staring into each other’s face.
After annexing Crimea in 2014, Russia began supporting an insurgency of pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass region. Today, a large part of it remains under the control of separatists who continue to fight the Ukrainian Army. More than 13,000 people have been killed there since the war began seven years ago.
Whether this current troop buildup is just saber-rattling or preparations for war is unclear, but it looks increasingly dangerous as the events continue to unfold against the backdrop of mutual accusations, regular back and forth barrages of artillery volleys and sniper fire along the 500 kilometer “contact line”.
The last time these two regular armies faced each was at the battle of Ilovaisk that started on August 7, 2014, when the Ukrainian army and paramilitary groups attempted to capture the town of Ilovaisk from pro-Russian insurgents affiliated with the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and units of the Russian Armed Forces.
Although Ukrainian forces were able to enter the town on August 18, they were encircled on August 26 by Russian military forces that crossed the border to join the battle. After days of encirclement, the parties came to an agreement to allow the Ukrainian forces to retreat from the city through a humanitarian corridor. It was not honored by the Russian side and many Ukrainian soldiers died whilst trying to escape.
According to Viktor Muzhenko, then the Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief, the battle’s outcome was the result of the involvement of Russian troops, along with Ukrainian commanders’ incompetence in the planning of the retreat.
With little leverage after the retreat, Ukraine was forced to enter the so-called Minsk Process, a reference to peace talks that followed in the Belarusian capital. In Minsk, intensive diplomatic talks involved two tracks – the OCSE chaired Trilateral Contact group and the Normandy Format. Both have only managed to localize and reduce the tensions for further armed confrontation, but they were unable to create the conditions needed for a durable and ‘just’ peace.
This did not stop the Minsk Agreements from becoming internationally accepted and often cited as the only approach to resolve the Donbass conflict. This status was reinforced by the 2015 UN Security Council Resolution 2202. The warring factions, however, were utterly incapable of finding a common interpretation of their obligations under the accord, which would have brought an end to the conflict some time ago.
Despite the unambiguous commitment by Ukraine’s international partners and mediators to find a settlement under the Minsk Agreement, the negotiations ground to a halt amid mutual accusations and finger-pointing.
The problems often cited for the flaws of the Minsk Agreements are their indistinct prioritization of the measures and the absence of binding deadlines and consequences in the event of non-implementation, both of which inherently contribute to their non-binding character.
The main problem, however, is that the agreements have been designed to freeze the conflict and effectively allow Russia to retain control over large parts of the Donbass as a buffer zone that is central to its overall security strategy. The Donbass would become federal-like lands that remain within Ukraine, but effectively operate as a Russian political and military protectorate that has the ability to block any major national or geopolitical move by Ukraine. Most importantly, the enclave that the Kremlin wants would have significant independence to manage its own internal affairs, plus full amnesty for the insurgents.
Ukraine is weary that Russia has been using frozen conflict zones elsewhere in the former Soviet space to gain local knowledge, influence and to foment separatism to the Kremlin’s advantage. By bringing the fighting to an end on their terms under the Minsk Agreement, Moscow effectively would halt or slow down Ukraine’s Western integration and would allow the Kremlin to establish a forward presence for its armed forces.
As Ukraine is slowly gaining military strength, it has been making it as clear that the current Minsk deal is unacceptable. Hence, Russia has now brought its troops to the Ukrainian border to insist on the terms.
Kyiv is in no rush to denounce the Minsk Agreements out of a fear that this may start the process of easing the sanctions imposed by the West against Russia. Ukraine would like the sanctions to stay and become even broader and harder on Russia – potentially to also cover the Russian-funded Nord Stream II gas pipeline to the EU, which, if it materializes, would lead to Ukraine losing about 2% of its GDP.
When it comes to this particular project, the West is divided and Russia is looking to exploit the deep divisions within the trans-Atlantic alliance. The current tensions on the Ukraine eastern border should be considered through the prism of this dynamic.
There was a sign of hope in July 2020 when Ukrainian, Russian and OSCE negotiators reached an agreement for a full ceasefire. Major combat ended, but sporadic clashes started again earlier this year, including the killing of civilians, Ukrainian soldiers and separatists.
Within weeks of the first shots being fired in January, troops from both sides moved back to their pre-ceasefire positions and effectively ended the small demilitarized zone that separated them and returned to engaging in jabs against each other.
Ukraine says 26 of its troops have died so far this year, compared to 50 in all of 2020. The separatists say more than 20 of theirs have also died this year. Who started the latest flare-up remains unclear, though each side blames the other.
The situation underlines the weakness of the Minsk Process. When the international leaders, including the EU, are calling for the parties to adhere to the Minsk Agreements, it is not clear to whose version they are referring to. The Minsk Agreements brokered by the West are ambiguous and Russia’s interpretation is unacceptable to Ukraine.
The situation requires a new approach. The Russians are using their troops to increase its leverage, just as they did at Ilovaisk and at the Battle of Debaltseve (where a hybrid force of Russian regulars, special ops and separatists surrounded and routed the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the last major engagement of the war in February 2015).
Ukraine should be well-advised to avoid committing any provocations, but this may not be easy to achieve now when troops, including loosely-controlled paramilitaries, are actively deployed on both sides.
With regards to the current standoff and generally, the West and Ukraine have to assume that Russia’s decision to create tensions on the border has a purpose beyond a short-term confrontation. The Russians will not leave the Ukrainian question because the border goes through Russia’s agricultural heartland, which includes large population centers and transportation networks. Moreover, back in 2014, when Russia illegally annexed Crimea, Ukraine shut off a nearby 400-kilometer-long canal that Crimea depends on for water.
Russia has to assume that the West’s interest in creating a pro-Western environment in Ukraine has a purpose beyond the country. From the Russian point of view, not only have they have lost a critical buffer zone in Ukraine, but Ukrainian forces hostile to Russia have moved toward the Russian border. As a result, the Kremlin has to assume that the West’s interests in Ukraine are a threat to Putin’s regime.
At the same time, the West cannot assume that if Russia is allowed to reclaim parts of Ukraine, it will stop there. Russia occupies the stronger position, vis-à-vis Kyiv, which still remains corrupt, under-reformed and economically weak. Russia, however, is in a far weaker position compared to the West. Even with the current troop buildup, the Kremlin is in no position to project a significant conventional force against NATO, but it does have the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.
Any new war would be most unfortunate as it would result in another major crisis. Hence, the West should press both parties to follow the Minsk Protocols for an immediate ceasefire and the removal of troops to a safe distance. The crisis should be considered as the strongest indication yet that there is a need to recognize that the Minsk Process is broken and that confrontations like the current situation may be expected at any time, and may be more difficult to control in the future.
The next step for the West should be initiating a new comprehensive treaty that would take care of regional insecurities and prioritize steps and measures, binding obligations, deadlines and consequences for non-implementation. To do so will not be easy and would require compromises from all sides.
