In this era of Great Power competition, or Cold War 2.0, there are a plethora of analyses and commentaries about evolving geopolitical affairs, including relations between the so-called small countries with the Great Powers (the U.S., China, and Russia), the European Union, Japan, and medium and rising powers (Brazil, Kazakhstan, India or Turkey). However, an often-overlooked topic is how countries with a more limited global footprint interact with their peers.
These partnerships are also crucial components of any country’s diplomatic strategy to secure diplomatic support and trade partners. For example, the Republic of Moldova is not solely laser-focused on joining the European Union but also engaging its regional European neighbors and lesser-known blocs.
Moldovan President Maia Sandu, re-elected for a second term in late 2024, has stated her government’s objective to join the European Union by the end of the decade, if not earlier. While Chisinau-Moscow relations have deteriorated due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chisinau-Washington relations have strengthened. Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Mihai Popsoi visited Washington in early April. In a discussion at the Atlantic Council, a respected think tank in America’s capital, Popsoi addressed the challenges of EU membership and the future of U.S. -Moldova relations. One bureaucratic victory was achieved in May, when Moldova joined the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), while Moldovan authorities are “strengthening capacities” to combat money laundering and terrorist financing by training with their EU counterparts.
Similarly, President Sandu has continued to engage with the other key officials, including NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos. She also participated in the recent European Political Community (EPC) summit in Tirana, Albania – anecdotally, Moldova hosted the EPC’s first summit in 2023.
However, focusing on diplomatic engagement with the usual suspects (Brussels, London, Paris, or Kyiv) does not provide a complete overview of Chisinau’s foreign policy, as President Sandu and Minister Popsoi have also met with European leaders from countries that are not traditionally regarded as powerhouses. In particular, engagement with Central, Eastern, and Southeast European continues.
Recent meetings help illustrate the situation. In recent months, President Sandu met with Montenegro’s President Jakov Milatovic and Prime Minister Milojko Spajic – their country also wants to join the EU, President Bajram Begaj of Albania, Prime Minister Evika Siliņa of Latvia, Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas of Lithuania, and President Konstantinos Tasoulas of Greece. Meanwhile, Minister Popsoi has met with his counterparts from Albania, Bulgaria, Denmark Estonia and Latvia.
The small country is also a member of regional blocs like the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), and the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (I discussed GUAM in a late 2022 essay).
Two other issues must be highlighted as they are linked to Chisinau’s diplomatic objectives: defense and energy. Moldova is a neutral state, but since the war in Ukraine commenced, Chisinau has increased defense training and engagement with Europe and the United States. The Moldovan military regularly trains in countries like Germany and Romania – in fact, Moldovan troops participated in the recent multinational exercise Saber Guardian 2025 in Romania alongside troops from Romania, Italy, and the United States. Similarly, Chisinau has signed deals with European states to diversify its energy imports.
Small State Diplomacy
How small states conduct diplomacy has been well studied with scholarly case studies of countries like Laos, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Some analyses focus on how small states navigate the evolving international (dis)order and multilateralism.
A 2024 report by the International Peace Institute argued that small states promote international peace and security, champion multilateralism and safeguard international law, defend the global commons, and advance multilateral action on frontier issues. A common fact mentioned is how small states will work together to push forward an agenda with countries that share similar interests. For example, the SIDS countries are focused on raising awareness about climate change and global warming since rising sea waters are an existential threat to them.
Integration and cooperation initiatives in Southeastern Europe exist but are more limited in scope. The historical tensions between some Balkan countries do not help the situation. Also, some regional blocs, like GUAM and the BSEC can border on irrelevance due to the different foreign policies of their member states — which include relations towards Russia — and the situation on the European mainland and Black Sea due to the war. Another factor is the importance or lack thereof that governments give to regional blocs and their direct geographic neighbors compared to prioritizing engagement with the Global Powers or more successful blocs like the European Union.
As for Moldova, academic work on the country’s foreign policy is growing given Moldova’s evolving diplomatic interests (join the EU and reduce dependency on Russia) and sensitive defense strategy: remaining neutral but improving military readiness by acquiring new equipment and training with the U.S. and European armed forces. A 2024 essay in the Scientific Bulletin summarizes that Moldova “has employed a range of strategies to navigate its geopolitical challenges and enhance its role in international relations,” like participating in multilateral organizations, successfully using public diplomacy, improving its international image by promoting itself as a neutral country, and strengthening partnerships with non-governmental organizations.
In a recent interview with the Moldovan news agency Noi.md, political scientist Ian Lisnevschi similarly advised a broader focus of the country’s foreign policy, “we need to build new relations in the conditions of a multipolar world.” While the EU is important, Lisnevschi advised increasing bilateral relations with other European states. “A new doctrine is coming, a new type of multipolar relations,” with a focus on bilateral relations, he explained. As I have discussed, Chisinau already has a special relationship with Paris and Bucharest, and similar partnerships should be achieved with Podgorica, Sofia, and Tallinn.
Engaging with fellow small European countries will not solve Moldova’s major problems. The Russian-backed separatist region known as Transnistria will continue to exist, complete with so-called Russian peacekeepers. Similarly, because of the war in Ukraine, Russia as a market is closed to Moldova, which means Chisinau has to look for other trade partners (I recently discussed Moldova’s wine industry, a pillar of the country’s economy). Realistically speaking, while trade with Albania, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, or Kosovo can increase, Moldova requires access to bigger and richer markets to boost exports.
On the other hand, in this evolving and more complex multipolar world, having more friends is good diplomatic advice. It is entirely realistic and advisable for Chisinau to continue its objective of achieving EU membership and engaging European powerhouses while also developing strong partnerships with other states with limited global footprints.
