It has recently marked the half-year anniversary since France and Qatar announced a strategic partnership that will see the emirate invest €10 billion into the French economy over the next six years. The deal, unveiled in February 2024, was hailed by Emmanuel Macron as being “to the mutual benefit of both countries.”
The announcement was celebrated with a grand state banquet at the Élysée Palace, attended by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, alongside notable figures like Kylian Mbappe, Bernard Arnault, and Nasser Al-Khelaifi.
Despite the festivities and Macron’s optimistic portrayal of the agreement, the increasing influence of Qatar in France raises important questions about its impact on French domestic and foreign policies.
Qatar’s significant investments in France’s sports and luxury sectors, dating back much longer than the six months since the inauguration of this new funding, illustrate this growing sway. For instance, Katara Hospitality, owned by the Qatari government, spent over €4 billion in 2012 to purchase luxury hotels in Paris, Cannes, and Nice. In the same year, Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund acquired a one percent stake in Bernard Arnault’s renowned French brand, Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton (LVMH), for €680 million.
In 2013, Qatari investors bought the department store company Printemps, operating sixteen stores in France, for an estimated €1.6 billion. Additionally, since acquiring seventy percent of Paris Saint-Germain football club’s shares in 2011 for €70 million, Qatari Sport Investments (QSI) has spent over €1.5 billion on new player transfers, eventually becoming the club’s sole owner by March 2012.
While the French government views Qatari investments as a healthy influx of capital, the sale of these national assets provides Qatar with cultural leverage that can influence French domestic affairs and foreign policy. This influence is particularly evident in the context of the ongoing conflict in Gaza following Hamas’s October 7 attack. Qatar and its ruling Al Thani royal family have a history of financially supporting Islamist groups, including Hamas. Research from the Counter Extremism Project has revealed that Qatar plays a primary role in supporting Hamas with upwards of half a billion US dollars in annual financial support.
Hamas’s leadership has been permitted to live freely above the law in Qatar, receiving substantial financial aid from the Qatari government which supports their activities. Former Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh watched the October 7 attack unfold live from his office in Doha and, months later, Sheikh Tamim Bin Ahmad Al-Thani shed tears whilst sat at the front of prayers commemorating Haniyeh after his assassination by Israeli forces. In responding to Haniyeh’s death, Al-Thani even went as far as to call into question the future of Qatari-mediated peace talks between Israel and Hamas. Multiple other Hamas leaders have also been photographed at luxury hotels, on private jets, and at diplomatic clubs around Doha in the months following the attack. This is not unusual for Qatar which is known to have provided state sanctuary to leaders from other terrorist groups including the Taliban, Al-Nusra Front, and Al-Qaeda.
Qatar is also home to the Hamas-friendly and highly influential Al-Jazeera media network. The network is owned and operated entirely by the Qatari state and is banned in Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Jordan, and Egypt for its obvious reporting biases and propaganda activities. France and the rest of the Western world are blind to this reality, however, and continue to permit Al-Jazeera to portray itself as a legitimate news source to their citizens.
Following the October 7 attack, Macron initially expressed “unreserved solidarity” with Israel. However, less than three weeks later, he urged Israel to cease its bombing in Gaza, swayed by significant pro-Gaza sentiment within French society and widespread protests across French universities.
The partnership with Qatar and the €10 billion investment may influence Macron’s stance. Hosting a state banquet for Qatar’s ruler, who supports Hamas, complicates France’s diplomatic position on the Gaza conflict.
It is very likely that Qatar’s influence in French politics extends further than soft power alone. France’s current Minister of Culture, Rachida Dati, has recently been revealed to have been in contact with Qatar’s labour minister, Ali bin Samikh al Marri, during the period of the Qatargate corruption scandal when she was serving as an MEP. Al Marri has been described as the leader of Qatar’s efforts to bribe members of the European Parliament by Belgian police and his connections with Dati is an eye-opening example of Qatari influence reaching deep into the heart of the French government.
France should consider limiting new investments from Qatar to retain control over key sectors of its economy and use its international platform to urge Qatar to address its support for designated individuals and terrorist groups. Reassessing the relationship with Qatar and addressing these issues is crucial for France’s foreign policy agenda.
