The idea of EU strategic autonomy originated in the field of security and defence in St. Malo Declaration (1998) and later in the 2016 EU Global Strategy. But it was not until French President Emmanuel Macron’s speech at Paris’ Sorbonne University in September 2017 that the concept has started to evolve and expand to other policy fields (encompassing i.e. industrial and technological independence) and has gained ground in Brussels and the EU capitals.
In the face of the COVID-19 recovery, a rivalry between the US and China on the global stage and the EU’s ambitions to bolster its position in the world, the debate on Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ and its freedom to act, has been receiving even more prominence. Not always in a positive sense.
While some European leaders see the EU’s ability to act autonomously and more independently from the United States as a political imperative to enable the continent to decide its own future without overly depending on others, others look at it with more reservation and skepticism.
For example, in Eastern Europe, together with the Baltics – countries’ with a strong pro-American orientation – fear that investing in European strategic autonomy will weaken the long-standing transatlantic bond and will become a synonym for protectionism, especially without the UK in the EU. There is also an old distrust in the EU, including in Eastern Europe, about France’s real intentions. As noticed by the Economist, in short, the idea of “strategic autonomy” and “sovereignty” has exposed old cracks within the European Union over how far Europe should, or could, do more to defend itself.
Years on, the concept of strategic autonomy remains vaguely defined and lacks necessary buy-in from several EU nations. Instead of defining its content and discussing constructive ideas and solutions, many Europeans keep expending energy either on debating semantics and terminology (‘European sovereignty’ vs. ‘collective sovereignty’ vs. ‘strategic responsibility’ vs. ‘open strategic autonomy’) or seeking to silence the discussion tout court.
While a fair bit has been known about what the ‘old’ or ‘Western’ members of the bloc think about strategic autonomy, little ink has been spilled, however, on what Eastern Europe thinks, apart from being just ‘negative’ about the concept? In short, what arguments could be used to get better buy-in from the EU’s non-founding members?
While Eastern Europe is taking a cautious approach towards defining the degree of strategic autonomy that the bloc needs, it does not entirely oppose the concept. The governments of Eastern Europe understand that properly articulated strategic autonomy holds tremendous promise. According to the last report by GLOBSEC and the Atlantic Council, Eastern Europe will not resist strategic autonomy at all costs. These countries are cognizant of the fact that Europe remains dependent on outside powers in ways that are undesirable. But the devil lies in the details, and if European strategic autonomy is to be realized, the EU must first clarify the types of standards and capabilities it needs and its readiness to use them.
Brussels has to be made clear that pursuance of the EU’s strategic autonomy does not weaken the transatlantic bond. Any discussions that call into question the role of NATO and the United States in the region make Eastern European countries understandably apprehensive.
Second, European economic autonomy must not be taken to autarkic extremes. The adoption of a strategic approach could potentially increase Europe’s economic power, both by developing new production and know-how capacities and, perhaps more importantly, by enhancing its role in the globalized economy so that it can render its trade and investment ties more predictable and enforceable. But at the same time, the post-Communist region doesn’t buy into central planning. The region has learned from the past that slogans, five-year plans, and development directed from above are no way to catch up or lead the way.
Third, ‘the freedom to act’ or ‘decoupling’ should avoid an overly aggressive approach and eschew isolationism. Strategic autonomy, moreover, should not become synonymous with applying double standards within the common market, nor should it be used as a tool to justify protectionism.
To put it simply, strategic autonomy is not an impossible lift, but before things get off the ground, some fundamental questions need to be answered. What is clear, at least for now, is that complete autonomy will make Eastern Europeans nervous. If “full” becomes the goal, debate in Brussels will be tense and progress slow.
As for Eastern European countries, they will need to do a better job at articulating their positions, including on strategic autonomy, and converting them into policy process in Brussels. Eastern Europe is a vast and diverse region and it is understandable that avoiding cacophony is a challenging task. Additionally, Eastern European diplomats and negotiators are less networked and less embedded in European formal and informal institutions than their Western counterparts. There is a certain void to be filled in terms of fostering shared constructive regional views and communicating them effectively.
Time will tell whether the European ambition for strategic autonomy was a pipe dream or the stirrings of the third giant on the global stage.