Pompeo's Greece visit underlines Turkey’s isolation

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Greece on September 28-30 with the objective of making it clear to Turkey that the Trump Administration will not allow that country’s plans to expand its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean to come at the expense of Greece or Cyprus.  With that critical message underscored by a new permanent US naval deployment to Crete, the other agenda items included to complete Pompeo’s extended visit agenda were largely sweet-sounding hastily prepared supplemental meetings.
Pompeo’s trip was programmed so that practically every minute he was not at a site visit or other event was devoted to media interviews, generating multiple formulations and echoes of his core message focused on reducing tension in the region and condemning unilateral actions (although not always naming Turkey) in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean which increase anxiety.  Turkey appears to have gotten the messages sent by Washington and the EU over recent weeks and had already agreed to relaunch NATO-sponsored “deconfliction” talks with Greece as well as taking steps to recall its seismic exploration vessel from disputed waters.
A rare two-stop visit
Coming on the heels of Secretary Pompeo’s flash September 12 stopover in Cyprus when tensions were actually much higher, with the parallel objective of signaling Turkey that it must end its aggressive energy exploration activities in the region, Pompeo’s Greece visit was one of the key elements of a European swing by Pompeo that also includes Italy, The Holy See and Croatia. The September 28-30 Greece visit bypassed Athens completely and included stops in Thessaloniki and Crete, both of which are extremely rare destinations for American secretaries of state, other than for transit/refueling at the US Navy’s large Souda Bay naval base. Other American cabinet-level officials, such as the secretaries of defense and commerce, are more frequently seen in Souda Bay and occasionally Thessaloniki.
Bilateral relations: All about the narrative
Since last October’s signing by Secretary Pompeo and Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias of the Protocol of Amendment to the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA), the verbal tussle in Greece over the state of bilateral US-Greece relations has hit new highs, with the government of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis currently holding the high ground.  His predecessor, the leftist former PM Alexis Tsipras, allowed his foreign minister to characterize the bilateral relationship as having hit the historical zenith during his term, something the US Embassy in Athens did not dispute at the time, but others energetically did.
Tsipras and his cadre of hard-left socialists attempted to ignore the extensive cooperation between Washington and Athens on Balkan stabilization and joint investments in economic development under an earlier Greek government led by former PM Costas Simitis (of the PASOK party, also socialist), which was seen by many as a short-sighted attempt to recast history and erase the results of the visit of President Bill Clinton to Greece in 1999 which focused heavily on expanding cooperation on Balkan stabilization, with Greece contributing substantial financial resources and political support to the project, changing the face of the region’s economy forever. That lack of Greek financial resources to support Balkan economic development is what distinguishes the earlier more prosperous period from today’s still impoverished Greece which can provide little more than moral/political support and its important location.

The formulation used by Washington to announce Pompeo’s visit seems to show that somebody paid attention to this cacophony.  Instead of allowing the bilateral relationship to be labeled “the best relationship ever,” the narrative from Washington has been adjusted to note that Secretary Pompeo was traveling to Greece to, among other things, “celebrate the strongest U.S.-Greek relationship in decades,” thus acknowledging previous high-water periods under different US presidents and the accomplishments made then. Pompeo did however bypass the nuanced statement from the State Department at one point during the visit to characterize relations “at an all-time high” in one session with the media.
The Mitsotakis government can, however, claim to have taken the bilateral military-to-military relationship to a higher level than previously reached thanks to the provision included in last year’s protocol that keeps the modernized MDCA in force until one side formally requests termination.  The US had been reluctant to scale up military presence or invest in costly upgrades, specifically at the large American-controlled facility called Naval Support Activity Souda, without the longer timeframe the new agreement allows, and Pompeo’s visit to the facility confirmed already existing optimism that Souda’s role would be upgraded (see below).
Thessaloniki
During his Thessaloniki stop on September 28 (he arrived in the early morning hours from Washington), Pompeo signed an updated bilateral Science and Technology agreement with Greek Development Minister Adonis Georgiadis and hosted energy sector business leaders for a brief discussion that focused on energy diversification and infrastructure projects in Greece.  
That particular agreement was an update of the 1980 umbrella Science and Technology Agreement but includes new provisions to resolve problems related to liability, intellectual property rights, and dispute resolution.  The US Government has been updating older Science and Technology Agreements with many countries over the last several years, but the US Embassy in Athens put out a fact sheet describing the new agreement which focused heavily on the potential benefits for US technology investors coming to Greece that flow from the agreement and said next to nothing about future collaboration in scientific research.
Pompeo also met with Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias to conduct what was termed “a high-level review of the U.S.-Greece Strategic Dialogue,” in anticipation of the third Strategic Dialogue to be held in Washington, DC in 2021.  The program also included a badly timed visit to the important Jewish Museum in the city on Yom Kippur, the Jewish day of atonement and holiest day of the year, when it would normally be closed.
While in Thessaloniki, Pompeo said nothing about expanding US staffing at the small US Consulate General in Greece’s second city, which was downgraded years ago to a single officer diplomatic outpost, but ostensibly at the center of a growing regional economic, energy and technology hub for Southeastern Europe. Hope remains that resources will be found to partially restore the Consulate General’s skeleton staff as two decades before, Washington had even assigned a commercial attaché to supplement the much larger (at the time) Consulate staff on a trial basis to capitalize on these important regional trends but later quietly withdrew the position after sufficient business failed to materialize and then continued to cut staffing further.
Pompeo was greeted by energetic protests from leftist groups while in Thessaloniki, and his movements around the city were accordingly limited for security purposes.

Crete
The Crete segment of Pompeo’s trip was clearly the most newsworthy stop and Pompeo spent two nights at the Chania residence of Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis while partaking in multiple Cretan-style meals with the Mitsotakis family and select Greek cabinet ministers.
In Crete, Pompeo “officially” announced the US would be assigning the already present gigantic USS Hershel “Woody” Williams to the Souda Bay base as its new permanent home port (the US Ambassador to Greece had already previewed this in a public conference in mid-September 2019).
This decision was, at the very least, a solid “thank you” to Athens for the generous terms in the MDCA amendments Greece agreed to last year and underlines how seriously Washington now sees expanded military cooperation with Greece.  Some in Greece were hoping to hear from Pompeo that troops and equipment from the American base in Incirlik, Turkey would be transferred to Souda Bay, a rumor still being actively circulated in multiple media outlets, but nonetheless, the homeporting decision is significant and is a signal sent that, through the ship’s permanent deployment, will not be lost on Ankara.
Developed for the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command and acquired in 2018, the huge USS Hershel “Woody” Williams is classified as an Expeditionary Sea Base ship designed to support long-range force projection efforts and equipped mostly with helicopters and drones. Although combat capable, it is not intended for direct injection into high-intensity conflict and is currently assigned to the U.S. Africa Command.
Most of Pompeo’s messaging towards Turkey came against the background of the strengthening of the US-Greece military-to-military relationship and Pompeo’s visit to the Souda Bay base with Mitsotakis and his defense minister.  In fence-sitting mode during public remarks with Mitsotakis, Pompeo noted: “We strongly support dialogue between NATO allies Greece and Turkey and encourage them to resume discussion of these issues as soon as possible.”
In a stand-alone Greek media interview, Pompeo said a bit more “What’s not useful is when countries directly or unilaterally act in a way that causes conflict and creates the risk of escalation. We are driving towards the single objective of resolving this in a way that is consistent with international law, diplomatically.”
Pompeo’s extended time in Crete also provided him time to discuss with senior Greek officials active American interest in participating in parts of Greece’s new high priority military modernization program and making sure all of the purchase decisions by Athens are not made exclusively in favor of France which intervened diplomatically and militarily earlier in the summer in defense of both Greek and Cypriot maritime and energy interests. Greece has traditionally divided its arms purchases between major suppliers, mostly key allies, for political reasons.
Mixed reaction to trip
Most observers in Greece have been inspired by the fact that Pompeo is not visiting Turkey after the Greece stop as had been the American tradition for many years, although not strictly followed by Washington. However, one senior official will break off from the Pompeo entourage at the end of his European program and visit Turkey.
The Greek media also took perverse delight in practically every negative comment about the Pompeo visit generated in Turkey.  Most notable, the spokesman for Turkey’s governing AK Party, Omer Celik, said Washington’s assessment of the crisis in the region has been “one-sided” and did not help in efforts to relaunch dialogue.
In recent days, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has sounded more conciliatory, noting “I invite all countries in the Mediterranean that are our neighbors, and especially Greece, to stop viewing the eastern Mediterranean as a zero-sum game. Come, let us together turn the Mediterranean into a basin of peace once again … let us make energy a matter for cooperation, not conflict.”
Moscow reacted as well to Pompeo’s comments, taking aim at his references to Russia’s efforts to destabilize the region. In a local tweet, the Russian Embassy in Athens said that “it is not the first time that American officials are trying, with public remarks, to pull the country into the anti-Russian front.” It concluded, “the anti-Russian hysteria can hardly find a sympathetic ear among the friendly Greek people.”

US political angle
Observers in the Greek American community instantly saw the announcement regarding the homeporting of the USS Woody Williams in Crete as an attempt by the Trump Administration to gather election-year votes from that community, which includes some vocal Trump supporters and major donors.  It is unclear whether this consideration in any way impacted the US Navy’s decision or whether it was purely driven by strategic and logistical concerns which appear sensible.  On the other side, however, some are wondering how much the cozy relationship Mitsotakis has developed with senior officials of the Trump Administration since his election in 2019 will cost Greece in the event Democratic Party nominee Joe Biden, already strongly connected to the majority of opinion leaders in the Greek-American community, wins the November election.