It is almost inconceivable to imagine a geographical space as vast and as diverse as what we call the Indo-Pacific region.
Imagine an area from Somalia, in the Horn of Africa, to South Africa on one side and an area that covers the entire Pacific region, the Indian subcontinent, South East Asia, China, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula. In reality, the Indo Pacific is more than a connected and coherent geographic entity, it is a fully formulated geopolitical concept.
Initially coined by the American Pacific Command as a response to perceived threats in an increasingly volatile Asia, the term soon turned into a byword for a clear geopolitical imperative – assert yourself and deal with China from a position of strength.
With the EU adopting and embracing the terminology to safeguard its interests and project its own ambitions far from its own backyard, a loud debate has started to assess not only the real intents but also the capacity to execute such an ambitious master plan.
It is not only about the magnitude of putting together propositions for such vast areas but it is also about the width and in-depth of the dimensions included in the strategy, from international development to trade to human rights to connectivity to the promotion of democracy.
Let’s make one thing clear: the strategy, even if stated otherwise, is primarily about Asia, especially India, South East Asia and China. The major criticism is whether the EU, with limited resources and a decision-making process that is still, at best, a work in progress and certainly not fast enough to respond to rapidly unfolding crises, should instead simply focus on its neighbors, the Middle East and Africa.
After all the despite several ongoing international missions, the common defense is not yet an arsenal of joint capabilities but more a vision pushed by immediate needs and external setbacks like the unilateral American withdrawal from Afghanistan or the recently announced military alliance between the US, UK and Australia.
As a consequence, it is tempting to wonder if, with so many “hot spots” in its backyard, an overstretched EU can effectively deal with half of the remaining planet. The real question isn’t if the EU should limit its leverage to Libya or the Sahel but rather if it can really afford to be absent and disengaged from Asia while re-doubling its efforts closer to home.
While it is true that EU’s ambitions in foreign policies and defense do not match its current capability to be an effective geopolitical player across the entire world, the stakes in Asia, are simply too high for the Europeans to remain indifferent to an increasingly emboldened and audacious China. The stakes are high not just over the control and sovereignty of some islets in the South China Sea or even Taiwan.
South East Asia has become the engine of the world economy and there is the realization within the EU capitals that their prosperity necessarily will be more and more linked, perhaps even dependent, on the rise and overall prosperity of a region that risks to be dominated by a great, but undemocratic, power in the form of China.
As consequence, Europe has to be more invested in this strategic area, combining its professed values with its pragmatic priorities, which are driven by mere self-interest.
Here it is where another type of fragility emerges from the Indo-Pacific Strategy. How can the EU promote its “principled and long term” engagement with the region, in other terms, working on human rights and democracy promotion, while pursuing economic and geopolitical interests all at once?
Take the example of India, an increasingly important partner that also is a democracy, striving to uplift the vast majority of its population from poverty.
There Prime Minister Narendra Modi, thanks to a masterful Minister of External Affairs, has been able to put India back at the center of global affairs, a move that has enhanced its international profile.
Before Modi’s government swept to power, India did not have a policy to deal with the EU, but now that relations between the EU and India are undertaking a transformative quantum leap.
Despite these positive moves, India’s human rights situation remains worrisome. Modi’s BJP political party, has started to project a sense of entitlement in the form of a monocultural majoritarianism that risks sweeping away the core tenants of India’s post-independence democracy.
The question of human rights and the promotion of democracy in the South East Asia are not only related to totalitarian regimes of Vietnam, Cambodia or the absolute monarchy of Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei, but also about how to effectively deal with a democratic backsliding in strategic nations like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.
Then we have the case of Philippines, key to counter Communist China and where the EU is investing considerably in terms of image but also home of a president that might ended up prosecuted internationally for his war on drug.
If the EU can pursue its own geopolitical interests while safeguarding also its core values as a foreign policy tool, then it is approach to the region will be a success story that will positively shape the dynamics of the region.
There is no doubt that is going to be a formidable task because one thing is to promote sustainable development and green technology but it is another story trying doing so while also tackling hard issues the local interlocutors are certainly not keen to face nor have any desire to be preached over. The real challenge, therefore, will be in the type of leadership the EU will project.
Can the EU sketch out and implement a humble approach to its positioning in the region, one that does not shy away from asserting the primacy of human rights and democracy not as “imported” goods but as universal values without compromising or hampering its own geopolitical and economic ambitions?
Would the EU itself be open to constructive dialogues that also will allow the partners of the region to air and advance their own positions based on values that significantly differ from its own? How for example further engage Singapore, a bastion of globalization where the EU has considerable interests, set to further increase, but also a top performer in human rights abuses?
The Indo-Pacific Strategy offers a vision and a number of concrete, pragmatic set of actions. A major boost in trade, enhanced green connectivity, the fight against climate change, these are some of the major plans for the region.
Finding the unanimity and with it, the agility to translate ambition into action that also enhances the values upon which the EU was founded while achieving its stated geopolitical and economic interests, is going to be a conundrum.
Pursuing the right balance in addressing this strategic dilemma is a must for the Europe if it wants to cement its credibility in the Asia Pacific as a self interested power that also aims for its own version of common prosperity.