Though recently derided as a vaccine protectionist, the EU is, in fact, an export powerhouse. The last month alone saw the bloc ship more than 25 million doses to at least 31 countries around the world even as European countries administered only around 21 million jabs domestically amid a severe vaccine shortfall.
This approach stands in stark contrast to the US, which is safeguarding national supplies and vaccine raw materials to ensure that every adult can get a jab by the end of May. The UK, similarly, has enforced a de facto ban on vaccine exports through a “Britain first” stipulation in its contract with AstraZeneca.
The EU’s magnanimity, nevertheless, has largely gone unnoticed. EU deliveries have proceeded without the pomp and circumstance that have accompanied shipments from other export giants. This raises the concern that the bloc is forgoing an opportunity to earn much needed political capital globally and promote its values-based model over alternatives.
Far more modest Chinese and Russian deliveries of Sinopharm and Sputnik V to countries like Serbia, Tunisia and Slova
India, meanwhile, has branded its own vaccine diplomacy programme as Vaccine Maitri or Vaccine Friendship. Buoyed with excess shots of Covishield, the local AstraZeneca label, New Delhi has turned to sending millions of jabs to dozens of “friends” throughout the world. The initiative has attracted widespread acclaim on social media.
The world leader in COVID-19 vaccinations, Israel, has gotten in on the game too. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has taken to publicly pronouncing that thousands of vaccines are being deployed to allies like the Czech Republic, Guatemala, and Honduras as a symbol of gratitude to governments “in return for things we already have received.”
These shipments, though they often pale in comparison to the millions of doses exported by the EU, have garnered considerably more favourable press coverage in recipient countries than the bloc’s own exports.
By failing to take the spotlight, in other words, the EU is relinquishing an opportunity to bolster its image and enhance its soft power throughout the world. Even more problematic, it is ceding the spoils of vaccine diplomacy to Russia and China, two countries with entirely different worldviews than its own.
China’s perceived success is coming off a year already marked by extensive “mask diplomacy” endeavours that have seen Beijing forge new relationships with regions, like Latin America, outside its traditional orbit and reinforce ties that could solidify the future of its Belt and Road Initiative.
Making matter worse, the EU, remarkably, has been on the receiving end of fierce criticism for its vaccine politics even as Beijing and Moscow are lauded for doing arguably far less. The bloc, notably, was lampooned following Italy’s recent decision, affirmed by the EU Commission, to halt a shipment of 250,000 AstraZeneca doses destined for Australia.
This latest rift comes on the heels of a long-going spat between the EU and AstraZeneca, with the bloc accusing the British-Swedish company of failing to honour its vaccine commitments. The delayed delivery of vaccines has indeed left EU supplies running dry. The bloc, notably, has only vaccinated 6.8 percent of its residents, with at least one dose, compared to 18.3 percent in the US and 33.3 percent in the UK.
Some member states, like Hungary and Slovakia, have already turned to Moscow and Beijing for vaccines, driving a wedge between EU countries and bolstering the vaccine diplomacy strategies of the two rivals.
These developments also represent a setback to the EU Commission’s pledge that the bloc would get more “geopolitical” and pursue a more “interests-based approach”. By declining to assert its deeds, the EU is surrendering global clout in a rare foreign policy moment where it has exceeded its peers.
EU officials, belatedly, are beginning to set the record straight. European Council President Charles Michel, in a stern rebuttal to criticism last week, defended the bloc as the “most inclusive world power”, undergirded by its support for the COVAX initiative and its open export policy in contrast to the US and UK.
Michel also lambasted the “highly limited but widely publicised operations” of China and Russia, pledging the EU would never engage in similar propaganda.
While glitzy airport press conferences would be tacky, the EU should, nonetheless, ensure that its contributions are adequately recognized if it wishes to enhance perceptions that it is a global leader.
EU officials, reportedly, have broached the subject of making greater fanfare out of publicizing the export figures but have been concerned that the public would be furious given the bloc’s vaccine scarcity.
Recent acts of solidarity by France and Germany, nevertheless, to send thousands of jabs to Slovakia and the Czech Republic, two member states facing an avalanche of coronavirus hospitalizations, received plaudits.
Europe’s export numbers are certain to continue leaking anyway. The EU would be prudent to adopt a balanced approach underlined by selective use of the export ban protocol for domestic purposes, when deemed appropriate, and the practice of vaccine diplomacy abroad.
The US, which is aiming to finish its own vaccination program by the end of May, has been bolstering its supply lines and has already announced its Quad alliance plan to distribute vaccine doses to Asia. Washington is, consequently, likely to vigorously join the vaccine diplomacy game in the summer and take a more conspicuous approach.
If the European Union wants to start playing the part of the geopolitical body it envisions itself to be, it is going to need to do the same.