Harmonious relations with Greece has become an objective of Turkish diplomacy. The European Union’s policy of conditionality linking progress in EU-Turkey relations to Ankara’s behavior, vis-à-vis its neighbor to the West, is the reason for this desire for harmony.
If showing off tranquillity with the Greeks was the objective, the recent foreign ministers’ meeting in Ankara was a failure for Turkish foreign policy. In an unusually undiplomatic manner Mevlut Cavusoglu and Nikos Dendias engaged in what has been termed a verbal boxing match that offered an amazed group of viewers a rare, comprehensive and official overview of the sour state of relations between the two old adversaries.
Breaking with an unwritten tradition of bilateral diplomacy, the ministers shared insights on the status of their discord in astonishing transparency and detail. Abandoning the official Greek language regime, according to which the sole item on the agenda should be the delimitation of the maritime borders, the Greek minister – and his Turkish colleague – referred to the entire spectrum of contentious Greek-Turkish issues.
These range from the various facets of the Aegean imbroglio, the more recent conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean, the treatment of the respective minorities and, last but not least, the Cyprus problem, arguably the most contentious of all.
In the end of the day, no durable conciliation between Greeks and Turks is conceivable without a solution of the “mother” of all Greek-Turkish conflicts. After years of standstill on the diplomatic front, next week’s informal Cyprus talks in Geneva mark yet another effort at reaching a solution for the divided island. It’s the first meeting since 2017 when hopes for a breakthrough were high following the election of Mustafa Akinci, an outspoken advocate of reunification, to the presidency on the Turkish Cypriot side. Today, this optimism is nowhere to be seen.
“We will no longer waste time on the federal solution”, said Cavusoglu, reiterating Ankara’s position that a “two-state solution” is the only realistic option. For the Greeks, both in Athens and Nicosia, the scenario of a formalization of the division is anathema: “The only solution can be the formation of a bizonal, bicommunal federation” Dendias said while voicing a principal shared by more or less the entire international community.
While the details of the workings of a reunified Cypriot republic remain sketchy and highly controversial, Washington, Moscow and Brussels are in rare agreement that the unity of the island state should be preserved under all circumstances.
“Expectations are fairly low, the two sides are quite apart, more than ever”, says Kostas Ifantis, a Professor of International Relations at Panteion University in Athens. Professor Mustafa Aydin of Kadir Has University in Istanbul agrees: “The best-case scenario is if the (UN) Secretary-General announces that there is sufficient ground to continue with talks between the two communities.”
Among the many contentious issues surrounding the talks is the question where the European Union fits in. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side want the EU out: “It is a union against us. It has no place at the negotiating table”, says Tahsin Ertugruloglu, the North’s top diplomat.
Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot side enjoys the benefits of sharing in official EU business and is understandably in favor of a pro-active European role: “We would like the EU representative to be present. It makes one wonder why Turkey does not accept the EU’s presence when it wants to follow a European course,” says government spokesman Kyriakos Koushos.
Europe currently has no prominent role in the Cypriot negotiations. Still, it goes without saying that eventually, the EU will have to play a pivotal role as any settlement would need to include provisions on the benefits (and obligations) of membership would be made available for the Turkish Cypriot community.
At this point, what may be termed the “Europeanization” of Greek-Turkish issues – a strategy pursued by the Athens government – comes in. Most accounts on the tumultuous Greek-Turkish foreign ministers’ press conference missed an important statement by Dendias: “Greece supports Turkey’s accession process”, the minister said. “We are convinced that, as neighbors, both sides stand to gain a great deal from the participation in the European Union of a Turkey that is fully integrated into the European family”.
Considering Ankara’s diplomatic isolation in Europe and the growing choir of opponents of Turkey’s membership, this Hellenic commitment is remarkable. Greek support for Ankara’s EU accession is by no means altruistic. It is led by the consideration that a candidate member must accept and adopt the acquis communitaire, the EU’s accumulated legislation and legal acts.
Importantly, and this explains Greece’s preference for Turkey joining, the acquis includes international treaties. Dendias said in Ankara: “If Turkey wants to become a member of the European Union, which I hope it does, it will also accept UNCLOS, the Convention on the Law of the Seas”.
The convention is highly relevant in the Greek-Turkish context as it prescribes a legally binding procedure to settle maritime border disputes. Turkey is one of the few countries not to have ratified the convention thereby blocking this avenue of conflict resolution.
It is unclear whether the present – or a future – government in Ankara is willing to join an international agreement which may be unfavorable for Turkey’s maritime aspirations in exchange for a hypothetical offer of membership in the EU.
Probably, the more important question is whether or not the EU is ready to open the door for the Turks if Ankara obliges to ratify the maritime convention, and by so doing paving the way for an amicable settlement with the Greeks.
Considering the political mood in Europe, this scenario for peace seems highly unlikely.
